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Justice Stevens, Religious Enthusiast
Andrew Koppelman *
The often-repeated allegation that Justice John Paul
Stevens is hostile to religion 1 has been authoritatively
debunked in a pair of fine essays by Eduardo Peñalver and
Christopher Eisgruber. 2 Here, I supplement their analyses
in three ways. First, I will push their analyses even
further, and show that Justice Stevens espouses a position
that, in its own way, has religious roots and
enthusiastically embraces a distinct conception of
religion. Second, I will argue that Stevens’s religionfriendliness casts doubt on their conclusion that his
fundamental concern is equality. At least as important to
him is protecting religion from corruption by the state.
Finally, I will argue that his position, in order to be
consistent, ought to acknowledge, more forthrightly than he
does, that it treats religion as a distinctive human good.
I. Hostility to Religion?
Begin by contrasting Stevens with his colleague
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who worries about the hostility
claim and so reveals its assumptions. In his first
Establishment Clause opinion, conspicuously parting company
with Stevens, Kennedy claimed that strict separation of
church and state “would require government in all its
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Diane Amann and Thomas Berg for
helpful comments, and to Marcia Lehr for research assistance. This is
the first piece I’ve written closely reading Justice Stevens’s work,
but I have also written a book that defends and elaborates upon one of
his dissenting opinions. See Andrew Koppelman with Tobias Barrington
Wolff, A Right to Discriminate? How the Case of Boy Scouts of America
v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (2009).
1
See the sources collected in Bill Barnhart & Gene Schlickman, John
Paul Stevens: An Independent Life 245-48 (2010).
2
Eduardo Moises Peñalver, Treating Religion as Speech: Justice
Stevens's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2241
(2006); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom,
and the Value of Equal Membership, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2177 (2006).
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multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the
exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious.” 3 If
this is right, then neutrality between Protestantism and
Catholicism is detrimental to Protestantism; neutrality
between Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism is detrimental
to Presbyterianism, and so forth. Religion yearns for, and
suffers detriment if it is denied, the state’s embrace. 4
Kennedy shifted to a less relaxed reading of the
Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman, 5 but there was
careful to leave unresolved “questions of the definition
and full scope of the principles governing the extent of
permitted accommodation by the State for the religious
beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.” 6 In a memo
to Justice Harry Blackmun explaining his refusal to delete
that language from his opinion, he emphasized the
importance of showing that the Court “is not expressing any
hostility to religion or religious persons.” 7
Justice Kennedy’s vision of the harms of secularity is
coupled with a deeply individualistic vision of
disestablishment. Its purpose, he thinks, is to prevent
coercion of individuals – understood broadly, as evidenced
by his invalidation of a graduation prayer in Lee v.
Weisman, but harm to individuals nonetheless. 8 Thus his
3

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Similarly,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Santa Fe School District v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000), dissenting from an opinion for the Court written by
Justice Stevens, declared: “The Court distorts existing precedent to
conclude that the school district’s student-message program is invalid
on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even more disturbing
than its holding is the tone of the Court’s opinion; it bristles with
hostility to all things religious in public life.”
4
Attorney General Edwin Meese, in his influential manifesto for
originalism, took a similar view. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony
Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 72930 (2009).
5
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
6
Id. at 586.
7
Quoted in Jan Crawford Greenberg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story
of the Struggle for Control of the United States Supreme Court 150
(rev. ed. 2008).
8
The same point has been made about Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, which, she thinks,
“prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community.” Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)(O’Connor, J., concurring).
O’Connor’s reading transforms the clause from a prescription about
institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right, a right not
to feel like an “outsider.” Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’
Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266, 300 (1987).
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recent majority opinion narrowly confining standing to
challenge Establishment Clause violations in Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. 9 Unless
individuals are demonstrably being hurt, no violation of
the Clause demands a judicial remedy. 10
This vision of disestablishment is blind to a central
purpose of this constitutional provision. That purpose
also evades some of Justice Stevens’s most sympathetic
interpreters. But it has not evaded Justice Stevens.
II. “Religious Beliefs Worthy of Respect”
A major impetus for strict separation was the
religion-protective idea that religion can be corrupted by
state support. This idea is friendly to religion but,
precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state
away from religion. It is associated with the most
prominent early proponents of toleration and
disestablishment, including Milton, Roger Williams, Locke,
Pufendorf, Elisha Williams, Backus, Jefferson, Paine,
Leland, and Madison. 11 It is prominent, for example, in
Justice Hugo Black’s 1962 declaration in Engel v. Vitale 12
that the Establishment Clause “stands as an expression of
principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution
that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.” 13
Black claims that there is something fundamentally impious
about establishment. It breaches the “sacred” and the
“holy.” It is remarkable to find such prophetic language in
the U.S. Reports, but it has appeared there repeatedly, 14
9

131 S.Ct. 1436 (2011). See, to the same effect, Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007)(Kennedy in majority, Stevens
in dissent).
10
There is a counterstrand within Kennedy’s thinking, which emphasizes
the corruption of religion. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
589 (1992)(“The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious
beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either
proscribed or prescribed by the State.”). But the individualistic
theme swamps this in Kennedy’s overall conception and judicial
practice.
11
For a survey, see Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the
Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831 (2009).
12
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
13
Id. at 431-32, quoting Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (1785).
14
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that one “purpose of separation and neutrality is
to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close
an attachment to the organs of government”); Sch. Dist. of Abingdon v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not
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often in opinions written by Justice Black, the principal
architect of modern Establishment Clause theory. 15
Black retired from the Court in 1971. Justice Stevens
was not appointed until 1975. But the same themes can be
seen in the opinions of Justice Stevens. 16
only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and
controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the
devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes
too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government.”); Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(“[W]e have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that
complete separation between the state and religion is best for the
state and best for religion.”).
15
See Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause,
at 1888-92.
16
And in opinions that Stevens joined. See Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587, 643 (2007)(Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(quoting with approval
Justice Black’s statement in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11
(1947), that the framers thought “individual religious liberty could be
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to
tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions.”); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002)(Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(Establishment Clause
aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the specific
threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to educate the
children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their
faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871-72 (2000)(Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“government aid
corrupts religion”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243
(1997)(Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“religions supported by governments are
compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is
burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Univ.
of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995)(Souter, J., joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(“the Establishment Clause . . .
was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the
destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to
protect religion from a corrupting dependence on support from the
Government”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992)(Blackmun, J.,
joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“The favored religion
may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs
for their own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse
brings government regulation.”); id. at 615 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring)(quoting with approval Madison’s
statement that “religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the
less they are mixed together.” Letter from James Madison to Edward
Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders' Constitution 105, 106
(P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); id. at 627 (quoting the same
passage again, and citing the importance of “protecting religion from
the demeaning effects of any governmental embrace.”); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a Christmas
tree also works a distortion of the Jewish religious calendar.... [T]he
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In Wallace v. Jaffree, 17 his first majority opinion in
a religion case, Justice Stevens declares that “the Court
has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as
the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the
First Amendment.” 18 He analogizes state interference with
religion with the unconstitutional compulsion of speech.
He invokes the ideas of “individual freedom of mind” and
“the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.” 19 Here is the analogy: “Just as the
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of a broader concept of individual
freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose
his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain
from accepting the creed established by the majority.” 20
Here Stevens makes a noteworthy move, one that
distances him from the tendency of some other
separationists to rest their position on an abstract
invocation of “conscience.” 21 (Or, to anticipate Part III of
this Essay, the invocation of equality.) The right created
by the First Amendment “to select any religious faith or
none at all,” he writes, “derives support not only from the
interest in respecting the individual's freedom of
conscience, but also from the conviction that religious
beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and
voluntary choice by the faithful.” 22 He even goes so far as
to quote expressly religious arguments made by Madison:
“It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
city’s erection alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a
relatively minor Jewish religious holiday ... has the effect of
promoting a Christianized version of Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects not only
the State from being captured by the Church, but also protects the
Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for its
purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985) (Stevens in
majority) (“When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination
in matters of religious significance ... the freedom of even the
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion
into sacred matters.”); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 385 (1985) (Stevens in majority) (favored religions may be
“taint[ed] ... with a corrosive secularism”).
17
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
18
Id. at 50.
19
Id. at 51-52, quoting West Va. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 642
(1943), as quoted in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977).
20
Id. at 52.
21
See Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious
Exemptions, 15 Legal Theory 215, 215 n.1, 232-33 (2009).
22
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53.
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homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to
him.” 23
This language, with its emphasis on the inner light
rather than the outward form, reflects that Stevens is the
last Protestant on the Supreme Court. Uncorrupted
religion, for Stevens as much as for Backus or Leland,
consists in the liberty of the individual seeker after God
unimpeded by the state. Only beliefs generated by the
exercise of that liberty are “worthy of respect.” This is
not an uncontroversial religious view, although it is
pervasive in American law. 24
Thus, although he is suspicious of some religious
accommodations, he was part of the majority in Thomas v.
Review Board, 25 which found a constitutionally significant
burden on religion when the denial of unemployment benefits
puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.” 26 But Stevens’s
individualism is not Kennedy’s: he understands that the
protection of this individualistic understanding of
religion requires structural limitations on the state. He
has twice quoted with approval the following statement by
Clarence Darrow:
The realm of religion . . . is where knowledge leaves
off, and where faith begins, and it never has needed
the arm of the State for support, and wherever it has
received it, it has harmed both the public and the
religion that it would pretend to serve. 27
The theme appears in other Stevens opinions. His
dissent in Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works 28 emphasized “the
pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious
23

Id. at 53 n.38, quoting Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (1785).
24
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan observes that the individualistic
conception excludes quite a lot of religion: “for most religious
people everywhere at most times, religious leadership, and the form of
government of one’s religious community, is, in some sense, given, not
chosen, and related in explicit ways to government. Those are aspects
of religion that gives it its authority and its comfort.” Requiem for
the Establishment Clause, 25 Const. Comm. 309, 310 (2008).
25
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
26
Id. at 717-18. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Social Security, 489 U.S.
829 (1989)(both with Stevens in majority).
27
Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363
(1927) (on file with Clarence Darrow Papers, Library of Congress)
(punctuation corrected); quoted in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264
(1977)(Stevens, J., dissenting), and Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
28
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976).
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schools to compromise their religious mission without
wholly abandoning it.” 29 In Wolman v. Walter, 30 he was
concerned that “sectarian schools will be under pressure to
avoid textbooks which present a religious perspective on
secular subjects, so as to obtain the free textbooks
provided by the State.” 31 In Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 32 he
declared that the state had impermissibly “provided
official support to cement the attachment of young
adherents to a particular faith.” 33 The basis for his
suspicion of judicially imposed free exercise exemptions,
he explained, was his concern that it would place courts in
“the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims.” 34
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 35 he advocated “a strong presumption against the
display of religious symbols on public property,” 36 noting
the “risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the
faith being advertised as well as adherents who consider
the particular advertisement disrespectful.” 37 He cited
opponents of a state-funded crèche who “do not countenance
its use as an aid to commercialization of Christ’s
birthday.” 38 He quoted with approval Justice Black’s
declaration in Engel that “[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor
antireligious to say that each separate government in this
country should stay out of the business of writing or
sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely
religious function to the people themselves and to those
the people choose to look to for religious guidance.” 39
His admiring view of religion is also apparent in his
opinion for the Court in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society
29

Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
31
Id. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
512 U.S. 687 (1994).
33
Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)(Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); he quotes this passage and repeats the
point in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 & n.6 (1986)(Stevens,
J., concurring).
35
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
36
Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
accord Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 797, 806-07 (1995)(Stevens, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); quoted in part in Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 718
n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38
Id.; the sentence is repeated in Pinette, 515 U.S. at 812 n.19.
39
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 653 n. 14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
30
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v. Village of Stratton, 40 in which he declared, while
protecting door-to-door religious canvassing, that “[t]his
form of religious activity occupies the same high estate
under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits.” 41
Stevens demands a high wall
of separation because he wants to protect religion from the
state. As he put it in Van Orden v. Perry, 42 quoting
Madison, “religion & [Government] will both exist in
greater purity, the less they are mixed together.” 43
The same religion-protective impulse animates his
advocacy of strict separation to prevent government funding
of religious activities. From his earliest opinions to
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 44 in which he denounced “the use
of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands
of grammar school children in particular religious
faiths,” 45 he argued that state funding of religion would
violate the Establishment Clause. Yet in Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 46 he joined the majority
opinion’s holding that the use of public funds for a blind
student studying for the ministry was permissible, because
any aid “that ultimately flows to religious institutions
does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients.” 47 Evidently the problem
is not state funding as such. It is the potential of
selective funding to distort religious decisions.
III. The Equality Interpretation
Peñalver has shown that the pattern of Stevens’s
religion clause decisions – siding with the liberals on
Establishment Clause questions, invalidating public funding
of religion and public religious expression, while voting
with the conservatives in rejecting free exercise-based
40

536 U.S. 150 (2002).
Id. at 156.
42
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
43
Id. at 725 n. 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Letter from James
Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders'
Constitution 106 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); see also id.
(quoting same letter, noting the strong tendency to “some sort of
alliance or coalition between [Government] & Religion, which has such a
“corrupting influence on both the parties, that the danger cannot be
too carefully guarded [against]”); id. at 725 n. 26 (quoting same
letter: “Religion flourishes in greater purity, without than with the
aid of [government]”).
44
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
45
Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
47
Id. at 488.
41
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exemption claims – is animated, not (as some have claimed)
by hostility to religion, but by a distinctive perspective
that holds that religious majorities are uniquely
dangerous, and religious minorities are uniquely
vulnerable. “Judicial intervention in defense of religion
is . . . appropriate, on Justice Stevens’s view,
principally in situations in which the Court thinks it
likely that a religious group (or believer) is being
unfairly singled out for unequal treatment or where some
sub-category of religious groups (or believers) are
particularly vulnerable to state coercion.” 48 Special
benefits for religion raise his suspicions when they
benefit majorities, but such benefits for unusually
vulnerable groups do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Eisgruber similarly observes that Stevens is most
likely to intervene on behalf of free exercise claims when
a religious minority has received unusually unfavorable
treatment at the hands of the state, and from this infers
that his central concern is equal membership in society. 49
The central problem with establishment, according to
Eisgruber, is that it signifies second-class citizenship
for members of minority religions. He is more enthusiastic
than Peñalver about this theme in Stevens, but both are
confident that it is Stevens’s predominant concern in
religion clause adjudication.
Peñalver and Eisgruber are, I believe, correct in
thinking that equality is one central concern of Stevens. 50
But neither of them recognizes the difficulties of putting
this concern directly into practice. Both neglect the
importance, to Stevens and to Establishment Clause law more
generally, of the corruption concern.
It is true that the pattern of Stevens’s decisions is
one of protecting religious minorities. But is that the
result he is aiming for, and should lower courts try to
replicate this pattern? A major theme in Stevens’s
religion jurisprudence, from the beginning, is the need for

48

Peñalver, supra, at 2247.
Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal
Membership, supra, passim.
50
See also Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial
Government, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 885, 916-17 (2010). Amann notes
Stevens’s early encounters with anti-Jewish prejudice. When he took
his first law firm job, he wrote to his old boss, Justice Wiley
Rutledge, that the firm included several Jews, “contrary to the
practice of most of the successful outfits in Chicago.” He later
cofounded a small firm that included a Jewish partner. Id.
49

9

simple, workable rules. 51 Thomas Berg has shown that any
attempt by courts to specifically protect religious
minorities presents intractable difficulties: “Because of
America's complex patterns of religious identities, who is
a minority will often vary depending on the geographical
location, on the institutional setting in which a
particular legal issue arises, and on how one chooses the
key religious differences that sort groups into different
categories.” 52 The best way to protect minorities, he
argues, is to “follow rules structurally designed to
protect whoever happens to be the minority.” 53 This is, in
fact, what Stevens has been doing.
The most thorough attempt to work out a theory of the
religion clauses that directly operationalizes a concern
with equality is the collaborative work of Eisgruber and
Lawrence Sager, who claim Stevens as their champion on the
Court. 54 Like Stevens, they think religion is valuable, but
argue that it is unfair to privilege it over other, equally
valuable human activities. They do not always object to
the legal singling out of religion. Rather, their central
claim is that such singling out is only justifiable in
order to protect religion from discrimination. Among their
proof-texts is Justice Stevens’s declaration that “[a]
paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect
. . . a person from being made to feel like an outsider in
matters of faith, and a stranger in the political
community,” 55 and his declaration that constitutionally
mandatory exemptions “could be viewed as a protection

51

See Robert Judd Sickels, John Paul Stevens and the Constitution: The
Search for Balance 44-47 (1988).
52
Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 Wash.
U. L. Q. 919, 923 (2004).
53
Id. A similar point can be made about religious division, which is
also a persistent concern of Stevens. See Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L. J. 1667 (2006).
54
“Lawrence G. Sager and I have . . . shown how a Stevens-like
equality-based exemptions jurisprudence could lead to more robust
protection for religious conduct than the Court has ever provided.”
Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal
Membership, supra, at 2180. The theory is worked out at fullest length
in their book, Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious
Freedom and the Constitution (2007), which elaborates claims made in
earlier articles. (It discusses Stevens with approval at 264, 266.)
Because some details of the argument are stated more fully in those
articles, which aim at a more specialized readership, I will draw upon
them as well as the book.
55
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
799 (1995)(Stevens, J., dissenting), quoted in Eisgruber, Justice
Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal Membership, at 2179.

10

against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored
treatment for the members of the religious sect.” 56
Instead of privilege, they propose a principle that
they call equal liberty. 57 Equal liberty has three
components: (1) “no members of our political community
ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual
foundations of their important commitments and projects;” 58
(2) “aside from this deep and important concern with
discrimination, we have no constitutional reason to treat
religion as deserving special benefits or as subject to
special disabilities;” 59 (3) “citizens in general enjoy
broad space within which to pursue and act upon their most
valued commitments and projects, whether these be religious
or not.” 60 This “broad understanding of constitutional
liberty generally” will “allow religious practice to
flourish.” 61
Privileging and protection however are not
analytically distinct, but rather are logically continuous
with one another. The question is not whether, but rather
what, to privilege. Once this is understood, it becomes
clear that, just like a minority-protection principle,
Eisgruber and Sager’s equal liberty principle is empty and
unhelpful in resolving any actual legal question. It is
not a principle at all, but a worry about unfairness that
can at best play a useful role in influencing judgment
about inescapably discretionary decisions.
They reject claims “that religious convictions are more
important or in some way more valuable than all others,
that religious divisions are more dangerous than all
others, or that religion is uniquely immune to political
56

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264 n.3 (1982)(Stevens, J.,
concurring), quoted in Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom,
and the Value of Equal Membership, at 2179, who also cites a similar
statement in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 147
(1987)(Stevens, J., concurring). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1290
(1994), citing Stevens’s similar statement in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 716-23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
57
In earlier work, they referred to the same principle as “equal
regard.” “Equal regard requires that the state treat the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally.” The Vulnerability of Conscience at 1285. In their book,
they occasionally revert to the earlier term. See Religious Freedom
and the Constitution at 13, 89, 90-93, 96, 102, 120, 256.
58
Religious Freedom and the Constitution at 52.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 245.
61
Id. at 52-53.
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judgment and regulation.” 62 But they are not Benthamite
utilitarians who think that all preferences ought to be
treated the same. 63 Some concerns have special urgency,
religion is one of these, and it ought not to be privileged
relative to the others: “religion does not exhaust the
commitments and passions that move human beings in deep and
valuable ways.” 64 They offer several different formulations
of the criteria for admission into this set of particularly
important concerns: these are “deep” commitments; 65 religion
should not be privileged “by comparison to comparably
serious secular commitments;” 66 other concerns are equally
“important;” 67 “religious practices enjoy a dignity equal to
other deep human convictions (such as the love parents feel
for their children).” 68 Eisgruber and Sager deny “that
religion is a constitutional anomaly, a category of human
experience that demands special benefits and/or
necessitates special restrictions.” 69 However, they have
their own special class. It just happens to be larger than
“religion.”
Once it is stipulated that some human wants have a
stronger claim than others, the distinction between the two
models, of privilege and protection, disappears. What
Eisgruber and Sager really advocate is that deep
commitments be privileged relative to shallow ones, but
protected from discrimination relative to one another.
To see how privilege and protection are intertwined,
consider a familiar rule of law: all adults and no infants
may vote in elections. Under this rule, adults A and B may
vote, while infant C may not. A and B are thus privileged
relative to C. If someone proposes to deny A the right to
vote—say, because A is black, or female—this is
62
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Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v.
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68
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discriminatory, and A is entitled to be protected from such
a discriminatory rule. That rule would be wrong because it
would impose an equality of the wrong sort: it would treat
A as if she were (equal to) an infant. Guaranteeing the
right to vote to both A and B protects each from
discrimination relative to one another, but it also
privileges both relative to C.
Thus, Eisgruber and Sager are too confident when they
say, for example, that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is unconstitutional because it singles out religion and
treats it as more valuable than some other human
activities, or relieves religious people from burdens
others must bear. 70
How can we know that the legislative regime of which
RFRA is a part is giving unduly little weight to
nonreligious concerns? RFRA alone cannot tell us that. We
would have to know how those other concerns are in fact
treated.
Eisgruber and Sager respond that all discrimination
claims face a similar evidentiary problem: one always must
find a comparator to show that discrimination is
occurring. 71 But the real question is whether there is an
intelligible analytic distinction between privileging and
protection in this context. The difficulty is not merely
evidentiary. It is that without further specification, we
do not know what we are looking for evidence of.
Professor Eisgruber declares that this vagueness is
“deliberate, because I mean the proposition to be neutral
among various ways of filling out the concept—though I do
mean to insist that there exist some ‘comparably serious
and fundamental’ non-religious commitments.” 72 But in order
for the principle to have any bite, it is necessary to
specify what those commitments are. Unless that is done,
one cannot possibly tell whether they are unfairly being
treated less favorably than comparable religious
commitments.
Berg has shown that this is an intractable problem for
Eisgruber and Sager. “In any case involving accommodation
of a religious interest, numerous other personal
commitments and interests arguably are comparable, and the
government typically accommodates some and not others.” 73
70
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Eisgruber and Sager argue, for example, that, where a
police department allowed an officer to wear a beard for
medical reasons, it also was appropriately required to
allow a beard for religious reasons. But the same police
department did not allow beards “to mark an ethnic identity
or follow the model of an honored father.” 74 So the
requirement of equal regard is incoherent: “When some
deeply-felt interests are accommodated and others are not,
it is logically impossible to treat religion equally with
all of them.” 75
A similar difficulty is presented by the Eisgruber and
Sager-like position that Stevens takes in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 76 in which he declared that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the
states because it violated the Establishment Clause.
Stevens’s argument here is brief but dense and, I will
argue, combines two different arguments. The first is like
that of Eisgruber and Sager: other equally valuable
commitments are being slighted in favor of religion.
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne
happened to be a museum or an art gallery owned by an
atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption
from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of
the structure. Because the landmark is owned by the
Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its
owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption
from a generally applicable, neutral civil law. 77
Here the trouble is that some concerns that are just
as valuable as religious ones are being discriminated
against. But, as with Eisgruber and Sager, how can we tell
whether RFRA is part of a regime of unfair privilege?
Stevens once cited the “overriding interest in keeping the
government-whether it be the legislature or the courts-out
of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims” as a reason for denying
religious accommodations: “The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be
perceived as favoring one religion over another is an
important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to
preclude.” 78 If it is never permissible to single out
religion for special treatment, no specifically religious
74
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accommodation could ever be permitted. Yet this is not
Stevens’s view. In Cutter v. Wilkinson 79 he joined a
unanimous Court in upholding the The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against
Establishment Clause challenge. In Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 80 he joined a
unanimous Court in applying RFRA to limit the reach of
federal law, without a whisper about the Establishment
Clause. Perhaps he eventually was persuaded that facial
neutrality does not preclude religious discrimination. (He
does not defer to facial neutrality in the school funding
cases.) 81 So he has Establishment Clause worries, but they
don’t preclude every religious accommodation. Eisgruber
and Sager, defending Stevens, explain this pattern by
saying that accommodation is permissible when it aims at
preventing discrimination. Thus, “the Court’s analysis in
O Centro was dominated by concerns that could easily be
rephrased in the language of equality.” 82 As we have seen,
however, that standard is so malleable as to be
meaningless.
The rest of his Boerne concurrence raises a very
different concern:
Whether the Church would actually prevail under the
statute or not, the statute has provided the Church
with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can
obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as
opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First
Amendment. 83
Here the problem is not treating religion as a
distinctive human good. It is that the state is again
interfering with religion, here by favoring theism over
nontheism. 84 “[T]he Establishment Clause requires the same
respect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a
Christian faith.” 85 There is a tension between this
79
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argument and the one about singling out religion, because
the protection of religion from state interference itself
singles out religion for special treatment.
This concern could be addressed by understanding
“religion” at such a high level of abstraction that it is
not conflated with theism. That is, in fact, what the
Court has done in other contexts. 86 Stevens never takes up
this possibility, but, I will argue in the next section, it
is the approach most consistent with his general religion
clause jurisprudence.
The deepest difference between the Eisgruber-Sager
approach and Stevens’s jurisprudence is that the former
focuses on civil status, and thus on harm to individuals,
to the complete exclusion of any distinctive concern about
protecting religion as such from state control. As with
Kennedy, this can weaken the force of disestablishment.
Consider Van Orden v. Perry, 87 a Ten Commandments
display case, in which Stevens objected that the display
impermissibly “places the State at the center of a serious
sectarian dispute.” 88 This is because “[t]here are many
distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by
different religions and even different denominations within
a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these
differences may be of enormous religious significance.” 89
Scalia (here joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas)
retorted that “The sectarian dispute regarding text, if
serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious
adherents are even aware that there are competing versions
with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not).” 90
Justice Scalia envisions a role for the Court in which
it decides which articles of faith are sufficiently widely
86
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shared to be eligible for state endorsement (and in which
determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of
law). Evidently, the state may endorse any religious
proposition so long as that proposition is (or is believed
by a judge unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be) a
matter of agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam.
Justice Stevens, of course, was having none of this.
But if, as Eisgruber and Sager think, Stevens’s
jurisprudence is only about equal public status, then
Scalia is right and Stevens should have been persuaded.
Most citizens are not sufficiently well schooled in
theology to know or care that the state is adjudicating a
religious question. If they don’t know about it, then it
can’t adversely affect anyone’s public status. But
evidently Stevens cares about more than public status. 91
If the underlying concern is the protection of
religion from corruption, then equality remains a pressing
concern: discrimination among religious views is likely to
produce a degraded form of public religion. But equality
does not exhaust the concerns of disestablishment. The
central concern is structural, having to do with the proper
relations between the state and religion. It is neither
about coercion of individuals nor second-class status for
groups.
IV. The Good of Religion?
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One of the impulses that drives Scalia away from Stevens
is the suspicion that Stevens’s views are incoherent: he
opposes special treatment of religion, yet sometimes
supports free exercise accommodations. “We have not yet
come close to reconciling [the requirement that government
not advance religion] and our Free Exercise cases, and
typically we do not really try.” 92 The solution Scalia and
others have proposed would impose dramatic limits upon the
Establishment Clause. They would read the Clause only to
prohibit favoritism among monotheistic sects, while
permitting states to favor monotheistic religion over its
rivals, religious and nonreligious. 93 As we just saw in our
discussion of the Ten Commandments case, Justice Kennedy,
who joined Scalia’s opinion in pertinent part, is tempted
by this solution.
Scalia has a point. It is not logically possible for
the government both to be neutral between religion and
nonreligion and to give religion special protection. Some
justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the
First Amendment as in tension with itself.
This apparent tension can be resolved in the following
way. Begin with an axiom: The Establishment Clause forbids
the state from declaring religious truth. A number of
considerations support this requirement that the government
keep its hands off religious doctrine. One reason why it
is so forbidden is because the state is incompetent to
determine the nature of this truth. Another, a bitter
lesson of the history that produced the Establishment
Clause, is that the use of state power to resolve religious
controversies is terribly divisive and does not really
resolve anything. State involvement in religious matters
has tended to oppress religious minorities. Finally, there
is the consideration that, I have shown, is a major concern
for Stevens: the idea that establishment tends to corrupt
religion.
These considerations mandate a kind of neutrality.
The state may not favor one religion over another. 94 It
also may not take a position on contested theological
propositions. The scope of neutrality that the
Establishment Clause demands has become broader as the
range of contested theological positions has increased over
92
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time. Stevens understands this. American society’s
“enviable hallmark over the course of two centuries has
been the continuing expansion of religious pluralism and
tolerance.” 95 The core principle, Stevens has argued, is
that “the principle that government must remain neutral
between valid systems of belief. As religious pluralism has
expanded, so has our acceptance of what constitutes valid
belief systems.”96
It is, however, possible, without declaring religious
truth, for the state to favor religion at a very abstract
level. The Court noticed this in Texas Monthly v. Bullock 97
when it invalidated a law that granted a tax exemption to
theistic publications, but not atheistic or agnostic
publications. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion, which
Stevens joined, said that a targeted exemption would be
appropriate for publications that “sought to promote
reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate value
and the contours of a good or meaningful life.” 98 Justice
Blackmun thought it permissible for the state to favor
human activity that is specially concerned with “such
matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil,
being and nonbeing, right and wrong.” 99
What is
impermissible is for the state to decide that one set of
answers to these questions is the correct set.
But the state can abstain from endorsing any
specification of the best or truest religion while treating
religion as such, understood very abstractly, as valuable.
That is what the state in fact does. That is how it can
accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously
neutral. In Boerne, Stevens construed RFRA to discriminate
in favor of theism, but this was not the only way in which
the statute could be read. 100 The key to understanding the
coherence of First Amendment religion doctrine is to grasp
the specific, vaguely delimited level of abstraction at
which “religion” is understood.
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What in fact unites such disparate worldviews as
Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism is a well-established
and well-understood semantic practice of using the term
“religion” to signify them and relevantly analogous beliefs
and practices. Efforts to distill this practice into a
definition have been unavailing. 101 But the common
understanding of how to use the word has turned out to be
all that is needed. Courts almost never have any
difficulty in determining whether something is a religion
or not.
The list of reported cases that have had to determine
a definition of “religion” is a remarkably short one. The
reference I rely on here, Words and Phrases, is one of the
standard works of American legal research, a 132 volume set
collecting brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the
present. Each case discusses the contested definition of a
word whose meaning determines rights, duties, obligations,
and liabilities of the parties. 102 Some words have received
an enormous amount of attention from the courts. Two
examples, Abandonment and Abuse of Discretion, drawn at
random from the first volume of this immense compilation,
each exceed 100 pages. 103 Religion, on the other hand,
takes up less than five pages. 104 The question of what
“religion” means is theoretically intractable but, as a
practical matter, barely relevant. We know it when we see
it. And when we see it, we treat it as something good.
Strong separationism is a strategy for protecting this
good from corruption by the state. To call it hostile to
religion is confused to the point of perversity.
Stevens has never squarely embraced this answer to the
dilemma. Before he could be expected to do so, it would
have to be elaborated in considerably more detail than I
can attempt here. But that is another story. 105
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